Contracting with Researchers
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's preferre...
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| I publikationen: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2016) |
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| Huvudskapare: | , |
| Materialtyp: | Artikel |
| Språk: | engelska |
| Publicerad: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| Ämnen: | |
| Länkar: | PDF-fulltext |
| Taggar: |
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| Sammanfattning: | We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on
behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the
choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its
quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's
preferred technology choice. In the multiagent-setting researchers pursue
individual rather than overall success which yields a preference for
the most promising technology. We show that a mechanism that deters
this bias towards mainstream research always entails an effciency
loss if researchers are risk-averse. Our results suggest that there is too
little diversity in delegated research. |
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| Fysisk beskrivning: | 49 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0497 |