Contracting with Researchers
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's preferre...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2016) |
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| Autoren: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | PDF-Volltext |
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| Zusammenfassung: | We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on
behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the
choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its
quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's
preferred technology choice. In the multiagent-setting researchers pursue
individual rather than overall success which yields a preference for
the most promising technology. We show that a mechanism that deters
this bias towards mainstream research always entails an effciency
loss if researchers are risk-averse. Our results suggest that there is too
little diversity in delegated research. |
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| Umfang: | 49 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0497 |