Contracting still matters! Or: How to design a letter of intent
Any cooperation that profits from relation-specific investments suf- fers from the well-known hold-up problem. If investments are not enforceable by an outside authority, the gains fall prey to individual opportunism caused by a free-rider problem. If, in addition, individ- ual investments exhib...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 09-2009) |
|---|---|
| Autoren: | , |
| Format: | Arbeit |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2009
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | PDF-Volltext |
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