Contracting still matters! Or: How to design a letter of intent

Any cooperation that profits from relation-specific investments suf- fers from the well-known hold-up problem. If investments are not enforceable by an outside authority, the gains fall prey to individual opportunism caused by a free-rider problem. If, in addition, individ- ual investments exhib...

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Veröffentlicht in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 09-2009)
Autoren: Korn, Evelyn, Meisenzahl, Stephan
Format: Arbeit
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2009
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Zusammenfassung:Any cooperation that profits from relation-specific investments suf- fers from the well-known hold-up problem. If investments are not enforceable by an outside authority, the gains fall prey to individual opportunism caused by a free-rider problem. If, in addition, individ- ual investments exhibit positive cross effects, Che and Hausch (1999) provide a negative result and show that contracts cannot overcome the hold up due to a lack of verifiable commitment. This paper develops a mechanism that provides such a commitment device: (1) It introduces an acknowledgement game that procures reliable. (2) It embeds the original contracting problem into two institutional designs - a market based one and a private design - that support enforcement. These two devices reestablish efficient investments as enforceable results of a contract.
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2023.0223