Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...
-д хадгалсан:
| -д хэвлэсэн: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016) |
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| Үндсэн зохиолчид: | , |
| Формат: | Өгүүллэг |
| Хэл сонгох: | англи |
| Хэвлэсэн: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| Нөхцлүүд: | |
| Онлайн хандалт: | PDF-н бүрэн текст |
| Шошгууд: |
Шошго байхгүй, Энэхүү баримтыг шошголох эхний хүн болох!
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| Тойм: | This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority. |
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| Биет тодорхойлолт: | 42 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0485 |