Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey
Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation models in merger control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, still a very young and innovative instrument...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 07-2008) |
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| Autoren: | , |
| Format: | Arbeit |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2008
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | PDF-Volltext |
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| Zusammenfassung: | Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical
methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation models in merger
control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, still a
very young and innovative instrument of antitrust and, therefore, its ‘technical’ potential is far
from being comprehensively exploited and teething problems in its practical use in the
antitrust environment prevail. We provide a classification of state-of-the-art merger
simulation models and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the
problems and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In summary,
merger simulation models represent an important and valuable extension of the toolbox of
merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic bullet and must be combined with
other, more traditional instruments of competition policy in order to comprehensively unfold
its beneficial effects. |
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| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2023.0194 |