Preselection and Expert Advice

We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 25-2015)
Main Authors: Schulte, Elisabeth, Felgenhauer, Mike
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2015
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Online Access:PDF Full Text
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Summary:We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking for advice, alters the expert’s perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.
Physical Description:33 Pages
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0384