Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemployment, and Welfare
Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production (syner...
I tiakina i:
| I whakaputaina i: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 07-2009) |
|---|---|
| Ngā kaituhi matua: | , |
| Hōputu: | Arbeit |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2009
|
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | Kuputuhi katoa PDF |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
|
| Whakarāpopototanga: | Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the
anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above
marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the
costs of production (synergies). However, demand-side effects of synergies are usually
neglected. We introduce them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by
assuming an (empirically supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific
synergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers
are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full employment
economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. Eventually, policy conclusions for merger
control are discussed. |
|---|---|
| Whakaahuatanga ōkiko: | 22 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2023.0221 |