Experimental Evidence on Forecaster (anti-) Herding in Sports Markets
We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in foreca...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
প্রকাশিত: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 38-2020) |
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প্রধান লেখক: | , , |
বিন্যাস: | প্রবন্ধ |
ভাষা: | ইংরেজি |
প্রকাশিত: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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বিষয়গুলি: | |
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | পিডিএফ এ সম্পূর্ন পাঠ |
ট্যাগগুলো: |
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সংক্ষিপ্ত: | We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts. |
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দৈহিক বর্ননা: | 29 Seiten |
আইএসএসএন: | 1867-3678 |
ডিওআই: | 10.17192/es2024.0664 |