Buchumschlag

Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability

We describe how product liability interacts with regulatory product approval in influencing a firm’s incentives to acquire information about product risk, using a very parsimonious model. The firm may have in- sufficient information acquisition incentives when it is not fully liable for the harm...

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Veröffentlicht in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 19-2017)
Autoren: Friehe, Tim, Schulte, Elisabeth
Format: Artikel
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Schlagworte:
Innovation
Product Liability
Wirtschaft
Uncertainty
Economics
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We describe how product liability interacts with regulatory product approval in influencing a firm’s incentives to acquire information about product risk, using a very parsimonious model. The firm may have in- sufficient information acquisition incentives when it is not fully liable for the harm caused by its product. The firm may also have excessive information acquisition incentives under both full and limited liability. We highlight efficiency inducing liability rules.
Umfang:16 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0500

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