Preselection and Expert Advice
We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking...
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Publié dans: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 25-2015) |
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Auteurs principaux: | , |
Format: | Article |
Langue: | anglais |
Publié: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2015
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Sujets: | |
Accès en ligne: | Texte intégral en PDF |
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Résumé: | We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking for advice, alters the expert’s perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker. |
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Description matérielle: | 33 Seiten |
ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0384 |