Incentives and the Delegation of Decision Making Power in Sovereign Wealth Funds
The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher t...
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| Publicat a: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 17-2011) |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Arbeit |
| Idioma: | anglès |
| Publicat: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2011
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| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | PDF a text complet |
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