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Asymmetric Tax Competition with Formula Apportionment

This paper analyzes asymmetric tax competition under formula apportionment. It sets up a model with multinationals where two welfare-maximizing jurisdictions of different size levy source-based corporate taxes and allocate taxes using the formula approach. At the Nash equilibrium, tax rates are too...

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Izdano u:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 43-2009)
Glavni autor: Wrede, Matthias
Format: Arbeit
Jezik:engleski
Izdano: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2009
Teme:
corporate taxation
Multinational enterprises
Wirtschaft
formula apportionment, asymmetric tax competition.
Economics
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Opis
Sažetak:This paper analyzes asymmetric tax competition under formula apportionment. It sets up a model with multinationals where two welfare-maximizing jurisdictions of different size levy source-based corporate taxes and allocate taxes using the formula approach. At the Nash equilibrium, tax rates are too low and public goods quantities are to small. The paper shows that the larger country levies a larger tax rate compared to the smaller country as it does under separate accounting. Citizens of the larger country are worse off than those of the smaller country.
Opis fizičkog objekta:17 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
Digitalni identifikator objekta:10.17192/es2024.0024

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