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Participation and Decision Making: A Three-person Power-to-take Experiment This paper
It is often conjectured that participatory decision making may increase acceptance even of unfavorable decisions. The present paper tests this conjecture in a three-person power-to-take game. Two takers decide which fraction of the responder's endowment to transfer to themselves; the respond...
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| Gepubliceerd in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 05-2008) |
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| Hoofdauteurs: | , |
| Formaat: | Artikel |
| Taal: | Engels |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2008
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| Onderwerpen: | |
| Online toegang: | PDF Full text |
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| Samenvatting: | It is often conjectured that participatory decision making may increase
acceptance even of unfavorable decisions. The present paper tests this conjecture
in a three-person power-to-take game. Two takers decide which fraction
of the responder's endowment to transfer to themselves; the responder
decides which part of the endowment to destroy. Thus, the responder can
punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to herself. We modify the game by
letting the responder participate in takers' transfer decision and consider the
e�ect of participation on the destruction rate. We �nd that participation
matters. Responders destroy more if they (1) had no opportunity to participate
in the decision making process and (2) are confronted with highly
unfavorable outcomes. This participation e�ect is highly signi�cant for those
responders (the majority) who show negative reciprocity (i.e., destroy more
when takers are greedier). |
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| DOI: | 10.17192/es2023.0192 |