Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular k...

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Veröffentlicht in:	MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 01-2008)
Autoren:	van Aaken, Anne, Feld, Lars P., Voigt, Stefan
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Philipps-Universität Marburg 2008
Schlagworte:	Wirtschaft Judicial Independence and Positive Constitutional Economics Prosecution Agencies Corruption Economics
Online-Zugang:	PDF-Volltext
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