Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft und das Opus postumum. Probleme der Deduktion und ihre Folgen.

In my dissertation I try to explicate the problem of the relation between the so-called Opus postumum (henceforth abbreviated as OP) and the Critique of Judgment (henceforth abbreviated as CJ). The thesis has two parts: in the first part I focus on the CJ (1790) and the so-called First Introduction which was published in 1794, in the second part I consider the OP, Kant's notes and fragments which were not published during his lifetime. I start with, in the first part, analysing the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason and the CJ - by focusing on the "analytic/dialectic" division and the role of the exposition and the deduction. In this way it becomes clear that the combination of the two parts of the CJ, aesthetics and teleology, is possible by the concept of the purposiveness of nature and the reflective judgment. Although aesthetics and teleology are constructed in a parallel manner the second part of the CJ, the Critique of the Teleological Judgment, has no deduction. I claim that Kant tried to prove the universality and the necessity of the teleological judgment without using the term "deduction" in the main part of the CJ. After pointing out the lack of the deduction of the teleological judgment I try to clarify Kant's argument by finding the trace of the "deduction" in §§ 66-68. He understands the "deduction" of the teleological judgment as the finding and determining of the origin of the judgement and the necessary conditions for it, but not as an examination of its validity. This meaning of the deduction is characteristic for the teleological judgement. With the completion of the CJ in 1790 Kant gained a new concept of the transcendental philosophy and achieved a restructuring of his system of the "Critique of Pure Reason", which should include the three critiques. The restructured critique as an idea - it could be called the fourth critique - is meant to precede the transcendental philosophy. But Kant's system is not completed because a chasm appears between the regulative observation of natural things and the universal concept of understanding. Therefore the concept of organism and the theory of materials must be reassessed in the OP. In the second part of my thesis I discuss the question why and how this reassessment is made in the OP by clarifying how organism and the theory of the moving force of the material are defined in "Transition 1-14", in the Fascicle VII, X and XI. In the end I come to show the relation between I, the world, and God. According to Kant, the human being as an organised subject must think about his connection with the world and with God, and he should unite these in himself. God is neither the originator of the world nor the world-soul, but a person, a being who has rights but not any duty. Kant says that God is within us, i.e. we conceive God as a being in our person which is as holy as he is. I as a subject must be the basis of the connection of the world and God, of nature and freedom. This is the highest and final elaboration of the transcendental philosophy which Kant worked on in the Fascicle I, notes he wrote towards the end of his life between 1800 and 1803.