Policy Competition, Imitation and Coordination Under Uncertainty

The paper analyzes under what circumstances policymakers experiment with policies with uncertain outcomes, when they prefer to imitate policies initiated in other countries, and when they prefer to coordinate policies internationally. Policymakers have private costs of active policies and compete in...

Full beskrivning

Sparad:
Bibliografiska uppgifter
I publikationen:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 18-2022)
Materialtyp: Artikel
Språk:engelska
Publicerad: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2022
Ämnen:
Länkar:PDF-fulltext
Taggar: Lägg till en tagg
Inga taggar, Lägg till första taggen!
Beskrivning
Sammanfattning:The paper analyzes under what circumstances policymakers experiment with policies with uncertain outcomes, when they prefer to imitate policies initiated in other countries, and when they prefer to coordinate policies internationally. Policymakers have private costs of active policies and compete internationally in a yardstick competition which gives rise to a potential distortion between what citizens want and what policymakers do. I find that policymakers’ policies as well as regime choice deviate from what citizens want but that an increase in uncertainty about policy outcomes decreases this distortion.
Fysisk beskrivning:18 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0727