Experimental Evidence on Forecaster (anti-) Herding in Sports Markets

We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in foreca...

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Publicat a:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 38-2020)
Autors principals: Bühren, Christoph, Meyer, Tim, Pierdzioch, Christian
Format: Article
Idioma:anglès
Publicat: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2020
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Sumari:We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts.
Descripció física:29 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0664