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Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
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| Опубликовано в:: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
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| Главный автор: | |
| Формат: | Статья |
| Язык: | английский |
| Опубликовано: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | PDF-полный текст |
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