Publikationsserver
Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
Zapisane w:
| Wydane w: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
|---|---|
| 1. autor: | |
| Format: | Artykuł |
| Język: | angielski |
| Wydane: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
|
| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | PDF pełnotekstowe |
| Etykiety: |
Dodaj etykietę
Nie ma etykietki, Dołącz pierwszą etykiete!
|
Napisz pierwszy komentarz!