Publikationsserver
Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
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| Gepubliceerd in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
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| Hoofdauteur: | |
| Formaat: | Artikel |
| Taal: | Engels |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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| Onderwerpen: | |
| Online toegang: | PDF Full text |
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