Publikationsserver
Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
I tiakina i:
| I whakaputaina i: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
|---|---|
| Kaituhi matua: | |
| Hōputu: | Tuhinga |
| Reo: | Ingarihi |
| I whakaputaina: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
|
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | Kuputuhi katoa PDF |
| Tags: |
Tāpirihia he Tūtohu
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!