Publikationsserver
Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
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| 出版年: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
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| 第一著者: | |
| フォーマット: | 論文 |
| 言語: | 英語 |
| 出版事項: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | PDFフルテキスト |
| タグ: |
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