Publikationsserver
Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
Salvato in:
| Pubblicato in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
|---|---|
| Autore principale: | |
| Natura: | Articolo |
| Lingua: | inglese |
| Pubblicazione: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | PDF Full Text |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
Lascia un commento!