Publikationsserver
Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
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| Izdano u: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
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| Glavni autor: | |
| Format: | Članak |
| Jezik: | engleski |
| Izdano: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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| Teme: | |
| Online pristup: | PDF cijeli tekst |
| Oznake: |
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