Publikationsserver
Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
Gorde:
| Argitaratua izan da: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
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| Egile nagusia: | |
| Formatua: | Artikulua |
| Hizkuntza: | ingelesa |
| Argitaratua: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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| Gaiak: | |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | PDF testu osoa |
| Etiketak: |
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