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Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
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| Published in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | PDF Full Text |
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