Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to l...
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Veröffentlicht in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2020) |
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1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | PDF-Volltext |
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PDF-VolltextSignatur: |
urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-06569 |
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Publikationsdatum: |
2024-01-19 |
Downloads: |
19 (2024) |
Lizenz: |
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
Zugangs-URL: |
https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0656 https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0656 |