Political Budget Cycles Revisited: Testing the Signalling Process
A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive...
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出版年: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 14-2020) |
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主要な著者: | , |
フォーマット: | 論文 |
言語: | 英語 |
出版事項: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
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主題: | |
オンライン・アクセス: | PDFフルテキスト |
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