Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings: Effects on product market competition
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NC...
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Опубліковано в:: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2019) |
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Автор: | |
Формат: | Стаття |
Мова: | Англійська |
Опубліковано: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2019
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Предмети: | |
Онлайн доступ: | PDF-повний текст |
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Резюме: | Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that _rms have an incentive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour. |
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Фізичний опис: | 34 Seiten |
ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0607 |