Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings: Effects on product market competition
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NC...
Furkejuvvon:
Publikašuvnnas: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2019) |
---|---|
Váldodahkki: | |
Materiálatiipa: | Artihkal |
Giella: | eaŋgalasgiella |
Almmustuhtton: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2019
|
Fáttát: | |
Liŋkkat: | PDF-ollesdeaksta |
Fáddágilkorat: |
Lasit fáddágilkoriid
Eai fáddágilkorat, Lasit vuosttaš fáddágilkora!
|
Čoahkkáigeassu: | Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that _rms have an incentive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour. |
---|---|
Olgguldas hápmi: | 34 Seiten |
ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0607 |