Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings: Effects on product market competition

Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings: Effects on product market competition

Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NC...

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Bibliografski detalji
Izdano u:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2019)
Glavni autor: de Haas, Samuel
Format: Članak
Jezik:engleski
Izdano: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2019
Teme:
Collusion
Minority Shareholdings
Wirtschaft
Coordinated Effects
Unilateral Effects
Merger Con- trol
Economics
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Opis
Sažetak:Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that _rms have an incentive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour.
Opis fizičkog objekta:34 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
Digitalni identifikator objekta:10.17192/es2024.0607

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