Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings: Effects on product market competition

Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NC...

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Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2019)
Autor Principal: de Haas, Samuel
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2019
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Zusammenfassung:Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that _rms have an incentive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour.
Descrición Física:34 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0607