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Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings: Effects on product market competition
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NC...
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| Vydáno v: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2019) |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Článek |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2019
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| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | Plný text ve formátu PDF |
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| Shrnutí: | Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that _rms have an incentive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour. |
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| Fyzický popis: | 34 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0607 |