Publikationsserver
Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings: Effects on product market competition
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NC...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রকাশিত: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2019) |
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| প্রধান লেখক: | |
| বিন্যাস: | প্রবন্ধ |
| ভাষা: | ইংরেজি |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2019
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| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | পিডিএফ এ সম্পূর্ন পাঠ |
| ট্যাগগুলো: |
ট্যাগ যুক্ত করুন
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| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that _rms have an incentive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour. |
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| দৈহিক বর্ননা: | 34 Seiten |
| আইএসএসএন: | 1867-3678 |
| ডিওআই: | 10.17192/es2024.0607 |