Publikationsserver
The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime
This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...
में बचाया:
| में प्रकाशित: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017) |
|---|---|
| मुख्य लेखक: | |
| स्वरूप: | लेख |
| भाषा: | अंग्रेज़ी |
| प्रकाशित: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2017
|
| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | पीडीएफ पूर्ण पाठ |
| टैग: |
टैग जोड़ें
कोई टैग नहीं, इस रिकॉर्ड को टैग करने वाले पहले व्यक्ति बनें!
|
| सारांश: | This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's
incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe
profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting
effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear,
capped bonus and linear contracts, can be adjusted in order to
promote agent's law abiding behavior. Any adjustment implies a loss
in internal efficiency which decreases in individual sanctions imposed
on the agent. |
|---|---|
| भौतिक वर्णन: | 34 Seiten |
| आईएसएसएन: | 1867-3678 |
| डिजिटल ऑब्जेक्ट पहचानकर्ता: | 10.17192/es2024.0549 |