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The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime
This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...
שמור ב:
| הוצא לאור ב: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017) |
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| מחבר ראשי: | |
| פורמט: | Artikel |
| שפה: | אנגלית |
| יצא לאור: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2017
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| נושאים: | |
| גישה מקוונת: | PDF-Volltext |
| תגים: |
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| סיכום: | This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's
incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe
profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting
effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear,
capped bonus and linear contracts, can be adjusted in order to
promote agent's law abiding behavior. Any adjustment implies a loss
in internal efficiency which decreases in individual sanctions imposed
on the agent. |
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| תיאור פיזי: | 34 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0549 |