The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...

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Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
Manylion Llyfryddiaeth
Cyhoeddwyd yn:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017)
Prif Awdur: Herold, Daniel
Fformat: Erthygl
Iaith:Saesneg
Cyhoeddwyd: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Pynciau:
cartels
Wirtschaft
corporate crime
moral hazard
incentive pay
Economics
Mynediad Ar-lein:Testun PDF llawn
Tagiau: Ychwanegu Tag
Dim Tagiau, Byddwch y cyntaf i dagio'r cofnod hwn!
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Crynodeb:This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus and linear contracts, can be adjusted in order to promote agent's law abiding behavior. Any adjustment implies a loss in internal efficiency which decreases in individual sanctions imposed on the agent.
Disgrifiad Corfforoll:34 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0549

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