The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...

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Opis bibliograficzny
Wydane w:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017)
1. autor: Herold, Daniel
Format: Artykuł
Język:angielski
Wydane: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Hasła przedmiotowe:
cartels
Wirtschaft
corporate crime
moral hazard
incentive pay
Economics
Dostęp online:PDF pełnotekstowe
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Opis
Streszczenie:This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus and linear contracts, can be adjusted in order to promote agent's law abiding behavior. Any adjustment implies a loss in internal efficiency which decreases in individual sanctions imposed on the agent.
Opis fizyczny:34 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0549

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