The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...

Volledige beschrijving

Bewaard in:
Bibliografische gegevens
Gepubliceerd in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017)
Hoofdauteur: Herold, Daniel
Formaat: Artikel
Taal:Engels
Gepubliceerd in: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Onderwerpen:
cartels
Wirtschaft
corporate crime
moral hazard
incentive pay
Economics
Online toegang:PDF Full text
Tags: Voeg label toe
Geen labels, Wees de eerste die dit record labelt!
Omschrijving
Samenvatting:This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus and linear contracts, can be adjusted in order to promote agent's law abiding behavior. Any adjustment implies a loss in internal efficiency which decreases in individual sanctions imposed on the agent.
Fysieke beschrijving:34 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0549

Gelijkaardige items