Publikationsserver
The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime
This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...
Furkejuvvon:
| Publikašuvnnas: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017) |
|---|---|
| Váldodahkki: | |
| Materiálatiipa: | Artihkal |
| Giella: | eaŋgalasgiella |
| Almmustuhtton: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2017
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| Fáttát: | |
| Liŋkkat: | PDF-ollesdeaksta |
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