The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime
This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...
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Publicado no: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017) |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Artigo |
Idioma: | inglês |
Publicado em: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2017
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Acesso em linha: | Texto integral em PDF |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics