The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...

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Vydáno v:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017)
Hlavní autor: Herold, Daniel
Médium: Článek
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Témata:
cartels
Wirtschaft
corporate crime
moral hazard
incentive pay
Economics
On-line přístup:Plný text ve formátu PDF
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Shrnutí:This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus and linear contracts, can be adjusted in order to promote agent's law abiding behavior. Any adjustment implies a loss in internal efficiency which decreases in individual sanctions imposed on the agent.
Fyzický popis:34 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0549

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