The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime

This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus...

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Détails bibliographiques
Publié dans:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 52-2017)
Auteur principal: Herold, Daniel
Format: Article
Langue:anglais
Publié: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Sujets:
cartels
Wirtschaft
corporate crime
moral hazard
incentive pay
Economics
Accès en ligne:Texte intégral en PDF
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