Non-cooperative and Cooperative Policy Reforms under Uncertainty and Spillovers

When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reform...

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書誌詳細
出版年:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 07-2017)
主要な著者: Hefeker, Carsten, Neugart, Michael
フォーマット: 論文
言語:英語
出版事項: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
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要約:When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reforms. From a social perspective, too many reforms follow if the spillover effects of reforms become sufficiently uncertain. Since centralization of policies to correct ineffcient policies is often not possible, we look for alternative instruments that can restore the effcient level of reforms. We compare subsidizing reform efforts with insuring against bad outcomes, and argue that subsidies are advanta- geous in terms of requiring less information for implementation.
物理的記述:25 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0533