Non-cooperative and Cooperative Policy Reforms under Uncertainty and Spillovers

When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reform...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 07-2017)
Main Authors: Hefeker, Carsten, Neugart, Michael
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
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Online Access:PDF Full Text
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Summary:When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reforms. From a social perspective, too many reforms follow if the spillover effects of reforms become sufficiently uncertain. Since centralization of policies to correct ineffcient policies is often not possible, we look for alternative instruments that can restore the effcient level of reforms. We compare subsidizing reform efforts with insuring against bad outcomes, and argue that subsidies are advanta- geous in terms of requiring less information for implementation.
Physical Description:25 Pages
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0533