Firm Selection and the Role of Union Heterogeneity

Empirical evidence suggests that high-productivity firms face stronger trade unions than low-productivity firms. Then a policy that puts all unions into a better bargaining position is no longer neutral for firm selection as in models with a uniform bargaining strength across firms. Using a Melit...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 43-2017)
Autoren: de Pinto, Marco, Michaelis, Jochen
Format: Artikel
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2017
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:PDF-Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Empirical evidence suggests that high-productivity firms face stronger trade unions than low-productivity firms. Then a policy that puts all unions into a better bargaining position is no longer neutral for firm selection as in models with a uniform bargaining strength across firms. Using a Melitztype model, we show that firm selection becomes less severe. Since more low-productivity firms enter the market, the negative employment effect of unionization is mitigated. Neglecting inter-union differences in bargaining power leads to an overestimation of the negative labor market effects. However, trade liberalization increases unemployment because firms with the least powerful labor unions have to leave the market.
Umfang:32 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0529