Exclusionary Practices in Two-Sided Markets: The Effect of Radius Clauses on Competition Between Shopping Centers

This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenant...

全面介绍

Gespeichert in:
书目详细资料
发表在:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 18-2015)
Autoren: Brühn, Tim, Götz, Georg
格式: 文件
语言:英语
出版: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2015
主题:
在线阅读:PDF-Volltext
标签: 添加标签
没有标签, 成为第一个标记此记录!
实物特征
总结:This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard two-sided market model with two competing shopping centers, we analyze incentives to introduce exclusivity clauses and the likely effects on social welfare. We show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for shopping centers and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the two shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.
实物描述:29 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0378