Exclusionary Practices in Two-Sided Markets: The Effect of Radius Clauses on Competition Between Shopping Centers

This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenant...

সম্পূর্ণ বিবরণ

সংরক্ষণ করুন:
গ্রন্থ-পঞ্জীর বিবরন
প্রকাশিত:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 18-2015)
প্রধান লেখক: Brühn, Tim, Götz, Georg
বিন্যাস: প্রবন্ধ
ভাষা:ইংরেজি
প্রকাশিত: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2015
বিষয়গুলি:
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন:পিডিএফ এ সম্পূর্ন পাঠ
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বিবরন
সংক্ষিপ্ত:This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard two-sided market model with two competing shopping centers, we analyze incentives to introduce exclusivity clauses and the likely effects on social welfare. We show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for shopping centers and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the two shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.
দৈহিক বর্ননা:29 Seiten
আইএসএসএন:1867-3678
ডিওআই:10.17192/es2024.0378