The Value of User-Specific Information for Two-Sided Matchmakers
This article analyzes the incentives of a monopolistic matchmaker to generate user-specific information. By merging two-sided market modeling with two-sided matching, we derive a micro-foundation of cross-side externalities as a function of the number of potential matches and the accuracy level of u...
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Veröffentlicht in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 48-2014) |
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Autoren: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2014
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Online-Zugang: | PDF-Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This article analyzes the incentives of a monopolistic matchmaker to generate user-specific information. By merging two-sided market modeling with two-sided matching, we derive a micro-foundation of cross-side externalities as a function of the number of potential matches and the accuracy level of user-specific information. Incentives to make fixed investments in identification technologies are determined by two effects that work in opposing directions: Whereas economies of scale work in favor of platforms with large customer bases, expected improvements to match quality are more significant for small-scale platforms. |
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Umfang: | 45 Seiten |
ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0349 |